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The prospects to solve the financial problems of the heavily indebted less developed and developing countries are dim at present. Uith a few exceptions, these countries face substantial difficulties to pay the interest on their loans, not to speak about repayment of the principal. Apart from debt relief, economic growth of the indebted countries is viewed as the primary means of improving their financial status. Therefore debt-equityswaps (DES) have been greeted with enthusiasm in the financial press as a device to improve economic growth and, at the same time, to reduce the foreign currency-denominated debt of the troubled countries (see, e.g., Economist <1987>, Schubert <1987>.
The mechanism of DES is as follows. Suppose that an investor wants to invest in an indebted country and that the proposed investment has been approved by the country's government. Then the investor can follow the conventional route and convert USdollars into local currency (i.e. the currency of the indebted country) at the official exchange rate. Alternatively, he can arrange a DES, i.e., he can buy in New York outstanding dollardenominated bonds (= $-loans), issued by the indebted country, at a price substantially below the face value. Then the central bank of the indebted country buys these loans from the investor for local currency such that the price equals the $-face value of the loan, multiplied by the official exchange rate. The central bank usually subtracts a discount from this amount, the size of which depends on the desirability of the investment from the viewpoint of the indebted country. The investor finally uses the local currency to finance the proposed investment. Usually the investor raises the equity capital of some local firm and the firm pays for the investment. Thus debt of the indebted country is converted into equity of a local firm. Alternatively, foreign currencydenominated debt of local firms may be converted into local currency-denominated equity. This explains the term "debt-equity- This example illustrates what are considered to be the main advantages of the DES. First, it is argued that DES reduce the investment outlay and therefore increase direct investment in the indebted country. This stimulates economic growth and thereby improves the country's financial status. Second, it is argued that the foreign indebtedness of the country is diminished by DES so that the debt problems are reduced. Therefore DES are viewed as an ingenious tool to improve the financial situation of indebted countries (Economist <1987>).
The purpose of this paper is to show that this favorable evaluation of DES is misleading. The main argument is as follows. DES can only be expected to improve the situation of an indebted country if they allow to improve the joint situation of the investors and the country as compared to conventional methods of financing investments. Such improvements can exist for three reasons:
(1) DES generate negative externalities. In other words, if VIS allow investors and the indebted country, taken together, to gain something at the expense of others, of creditor banks e.g., then DES may prove to be valuable for the indebted country. In this paper it is argued, however, that DES do not allow the investor and the indebted country to reap appreciable gains from external effects imposed on others. The reason is that in an efficient capital market the $-loans of the indebted country are priced such that their prices are not below the present value of the expected payments of interest and principal. Therefore DES do not allow investors and the indebted country, taken together, to gain something which they cannot gain by conventional financing of direct investments.
(2) The assumption underlying the preceding argument is that the capital market is efficient. This need not be true. It could be that the capital market and/or other institutional arrangements are inefficient and that DES remove part of these inefficiencies.
Then DES would be beneficial even if they generate no externalities.
The problem with discussing inefficiencies is that we do not have a satisfactory theory of efficient arrangements. Hence the discussion of DES-effects on inefficiencies will be fragmentary.
Given this caveat, we do not see any substantial improvements in efficiency, generated by DES. (Fehr <1986>) .
The Economic Setting of the Analysis
The model economy for which DES will be analyzed will be specified now. In this economy there exists an official market for foreign currencies with fixed exchange rates. Foreign currency can be bought from or sold to the central bank at the official exchange rate. This rate is assumed to be the same for al1 transactions .
In order to simplify the exposition, besides the local currency of the indebted country only one foreign currency will be taken into consideration, say, for instance, the US-dollar. Moreover, without loss of generality, the fixed exchange rate is assumed to be 1. The exchange rate is defined as units of local currency per dol1ar.
Besides the official exchange market a black market exists. The black exchange rate is denoted b. For indebted countries which face a $-shortage, usually b > 1, i.e. the black rate is higher than or equal to the fixed rate. These countries usually buy unlimited amounts of dollars at the official rate, but sell only limited amounts. Suppose b > 1. Then everybody who wants to convert dollars into local currency, would prefer to do it in the black market. Everybody who wants to convert local currency into dollars would prefer to do it in the official market. In order to prevent arbitrage between both markets, the government has to restrict access to at least one market. It can, e.g., threaten the existence of the black market by high penalties for black trade, or it can force receivers of current account $-income to convert the dollars at the official rate, and it can restrict $-sales at the official rate to specific purposes. The separation of both markets is usually imperfect, however, there is always some leakage (Zedillo <1986>).
DES represent a third market for buying local currency against dollars. This third market has various special features: (1) It is a one-way street since it is only possible to convert dollars into local currency, but not vice versa. (2) It can only be used with a special permission of the government which will be given only for specific purposes.
Let p denote the New York-dollar price for a $-loan of the indebted country, measured as a fraction of the face value of the loan. Hence a 1 000 $-face value-loan would sell at 1 000 p $ in New York. Let d denote the discount which the central bank subtracts when it buys the loan. This discount can be positive or negative. In the latter case, the central bank grants the investor a sub-idy on DES. Hence, at an official rate of 1, the investor would get l(l-d)*l 000 local currency units for a 1 000 dollar-face value-loan. Thus, the actual exchange rate in a DES, s,
The investor looks for the cheapest way to finance his investment. The total investment expenses are determined by the net dollar amount required. This amount depends on the applicable exchange rate, on transaction costs and on potential arbitrage profits which can be derived from financing the investment. The following analysis will provide some insight into the investor's choice between the three exchange markets and into sustainable differences between the corresponding exchange rates.
Suppose that the transaction costs are the same in every exchange market. The transaction costs in the black market include potential penalties for black trade if this is prohibited. Can the official exchange rate be higher than the black rate and the DESrate? If this were true, then every investor would buy local currency at the official rate unless the official exchange is associated with some disadvantages. Such disadvantages exist, for instance, if all official exchanges are officially registered so that the investor cannot escape taxation of the future investment income or he cannot reconvert the money back into dollars. These disadvantages could motivate a premium of the official over the black rate. If exchange at the official rate were anonymous such that the government does not know the identity of the investor, then nobody would buy local currency at a rate below the official rate. Hence the black rate could not stay below the official rate.
As all DES are officially registered, the potential disadvantages of official conversion apply to DES, too. Hence the DES-rate s cannot be below the official rate if (1) the DES-market is active, (2) investors are allowed to change in the official market and (3) no differences between both exchange markets besides the difference in exchange rates exist.
The question then is whether the black rate exceeds the DES-rate.
Governments usually prohibit black currency exchanges for financing direct investments. But this is not sufficient to render the DES-rate independent of the black rate. Foreign investors usually get a permission for direct investments only if they prove that they change the invested money in a government-approved manner. Therefore b > s would channel repatriated flight capital into the black market and foreign direct investment into the DES-market.
The question then is whether foreign investors, being barred from the black market, would be deterred from direct investments. If the black rate would emerge as the free rate in an unregulated exchange market, the foreign investors would regard the difference (b -s) as a government-imposed penalty on DES and adjust their investment decisions accordingly. It can be shown under fairly general conditions, however, that the free rate which would emerge after unifying the black and the official market, would lie between the black and the official rate (Lizondo <1987>) . Hence the black rate does not provide an unbiased estimate of the free rate. Thus foreign investors will not interpret (b -s) as a government-imposed penalty on DES. Therefore the government is free to choose a DES-rate below the black rate without necessarily deterring direct investments.
So far it has been assumed that conversion at the official exchange rate is not combined with any subsidies or penalties. As a result, no investor changes dollars at the official rate if s> 1.
The preceding results remain the same if the government subsidizes conversion at the official rate, but only to an extent such that this deal is still more expensive for an investor than a DES.
The Government's Analysis
The investor may regard the difference between the DES-rate s and the free rate f which would emerge in an unregulated exchange market, as a government subsidy (s> f) or penalty (s <f). If the government takes the same view on the difference (s-f), then the investor and the government together can benefit from DES as compared to a currency exchange at the rate f only if the DES provides additional advantages. These potential advantages can be split into three groups. The first group includes advantages which derive from external effects of DES forced upon third parties. The second group includes gains from reducing inefficiencies of the international capital market. The third group includes advantages which derive from the political process associated with DES.
Discussion of these potential advantages requires a standard of comparison. The standard of comparison for the evaluation of DES will be the convential method of financing direct investments.
This method entails conversion of dollars at the official rate plus, perhaps, a subsidy or penalty. The investor is indifferent between a DES and conventional financing if the latter implies conversion at the official rate 1 plus a subsidy of (s~l) local currency units per dollar.
External Effects of Debt-Equity-Swaps
The investor and the indebted country together prefer DES if DES impose negative externalities on third parties.
Two types of potential external effects of DES will be discussed, the first being external effects forced on the country's creditors and the second being external effects forced upon others. No net effect of default cost is generated then. One might argue that the country can always repay its local currency-denominated debt by printing money. But then the default costs are replaced by the costs of additional inflation. It is not clear whether these costs are lower than those of breaching the $-credit contract .
So far it has been assumed that the price p is unbiased. This assumption may be incorrect. Primarily European and Japanese cre-ditor banks sell these loans to other financial intermediaries or to investors who want to arrange a DES. US-banks which have a large portfolio of these loans but no default reserves, are reluctant to sell loans at a price below the face value because they are afraid of being forced to write off their other loans to the price p. As a consequence, this accounting problem dimi-J nishes the loan supply so that the price p should be biased upwards. Similarly, only specific loans are elegible for DES '• according to the rules of the indebted country. This may reinforce the upward bias.
, Another bias may be generated by asymmetric information about the country's future debt servicing policy. The "market" might be overly pessimistic so that the price is downward biased. As long as the "market" correctly anticipates the behavior of the country's government, the loan price is not biased downward.
This argument does not rule out another potential effect of DES, however. The existence of DES might change the government's debt servicing policy in order to signal a lower loan quality which, in turn, reduces the loan price p. Similarly, the government may intervene in the $-loan market to reduce the price p. This may be easy since the loan market appears to be rather illiquid. The rationale behind such a policy is as follows: The lower the price p is, the higher is the DES-rate s, ceteris paribus. Alternatively, This points to a strong reason why creditors should push for DESschemes: They hope that the indebted countries grant more favorable terms (on their own expense) to investors on DES as compared to conventional financing and that they (the banks) can reap some of these benefits via a higher price p.
Some of the indebted countries appear to recognize this danger.
Chile, for instance, sells the rights for DES in auctions so that investor rents from DES disappear to a large extent. The proceeds from the auction are earned by Chile, not by the investors nor by the creditors.
i Summarizing, in an efficient capital market DES do not generate 1 externalities which benefit the indebted country at the expense I of its creditors. Some reasons for inefficiencies have been ! i mentioned so that a net pricing bias may exist. But there is no evidence for a strong bias which benefits the indebted country and/or the investor at the expense of the creditors.
This result remains valid if the DES-rate s differs from the free rate f. Then the premium (s-f) may be considered a subsidy. This is earned by the investor and paid by the indebted country. But this subsidy does not reduce the creditor's wealth.
External Effects Forced On Others
Another external effect could be that DES enable the country to attract investments from other countries and thereby derive benefits at the expense of these countries. A necessary condition for this effect to exist is that a DES as compared to conventional financing creates additional wealth for the country and the investor, taken together. Then part of this wealth can be granted to the investor so that he redirects his investments from other countries to the country with the DES-scheme.
It has been shown before that DES do not force any appreciable loss on the country's creditors which benefits the country and/or the investor. Similarly, it is questionable whether LCS can reduce the country's default cost. Can the investor reap substantial tax benefits from a DES as compared to conventional financing at the expense of other countries? Although a tax effect may exist, it is hard to find a substantial effect. Hence the joint wealth of the country and the investor are likely to be about the same regardless of whether the investment is financed by a DES or by conventional methods. If this is true, then DES cannot attract investments at the expense of other countries as compared to conventional financing.
Summarizing, this section shows that presumably DES do not generate substantial external effects for the indebted country and the investor at the expense of others. It may be, on the contrary, that creditors gain from DES at the expense of the country.
Gains From Reducing Inefficiencies in the International
Capital Market
Even if the indebted country and the investor do not benefit from externalities, they might benefit from DES if DES reduce inefficiencies in the international capital market as compared to conventional financing.
First, the creditors may prefer DES in order to reduce moral hazard of the indebted countries. With conventional financing, the country receives dollars but may use these for consumption rather than for debt servicing. Uith DES-finane ing, the dollars go directly to the creditors, thus eliminating consumption.
Second, it is possible that the default cost is reduced by LCS so that DES are preferable. But, as has been argued before, empirical evidence does not support a clear answer. York. This purchase is usually mediated by a marketmaker who commands a fee. It has narrowed down to about one percent of the loan's face value (Marton <1987>, Euromoney <August 1986 .
Still this cost may be higher than that of conversion at the official rate. Thus a clear answer to the question which arrangement produces higher transaction costs, is not available.
Fifth, the existence of DES means a third exchange market and thus augments the scope for profitable arbitrage between exchange markets as discussed before. This may be viewed as an inefficiency generated by DES.
Summarizing, it is difficult to detect substantial improvements in the efficiency of the international capital market from DES as compared to conventional financing. Thus DES look favorable for the indebted country.
Alternatively, suppose the foreign investor converts dollars at the official rate 1 and gets a subsidy of (s-1) local currency units per dollar. This subsidy shows up in the current government's budget as an expense if the subsidy takes the form of a cash subsidy or it shows up in future budgets if the investor is granted future tax reliefs. In any case, the government has to declare a subsidy to the foreign investor which will be opposed by local competitors and, perhaps, by political parties which advocate a free market economy.
Although the foreign investor is indifferent between the DES and the substitute arrangement, the government's budget shows a profit for DES while it shows a loss for the substitute arrangement.
Hence the DES appears to be much more favorable for the indebted country. If people do not recognize that this budget effect is -, generated only by specific accounting rules, then a budget illusion in favor of DES exists.
The budget illusion may be closely associated with the illusion that in a DES the creditors loose money, that the creditors' loss accrues as a gain to the investor and that this gain enables the government not tosubsidize the investment. Hence the political opposition to DES can be expected to be weaker than that to substitute arrangements. Therefore governments which want to attract foreign investments may well prefer DES.
Summarizing, the DES reduces the governments's liquidity risk, improves its sovereignty and facilitates political decisions in favor of foreign investments. Thus DES may well appear favorable to the governments of indebted countries as compared to substitute arrangements.
Summary and Conclusion
The preceding analysis has shown that the effects of DES are very similar to those of dollar conversion at the official rate, combined with a subsidy of (s~l) per dollar. DES do not permit investors and indebted countries to reap appreciable gains from forcing negative external effects on other parties.. Hence they cannot expropriate creditors or others by DES. There is no evidence that DES improve the efficiency of the international capital market. The loan currency substitution which is part of the DES, reduces the indebted country's liquidity risk and increases its sovereignty. Illusions, associated with DES, may reduce political opposition to attracting foreign investments. Thus the governments of indebted countries may prefer DES. Apart from these political aspects, DES do not appear to increase the opportunity set of indebted countries and investors.
Thus the enthusiasm with which DES have been greeted is not wel1
founded. There is no evidence that direct investments in indebted countries will grow and thereby improve the economic prospects of these countries.
Sometimes it is argued that DES will induce repatriation of flight capital. This argument is not well founded, either. Uith respect to direct investments, it makes no difference, whether the doll as are funded with flight capital or other capital. Uith respect to portfolio investments, two cases have to be distinguished .
Case 1: In order to acquire officially part of a firm's equity or debt capital, the dollars have to be converted at the official rate, perhaps combined with a subsidy, or by DES. Thus the situation is the same as for direct investments.
Case 2: The owner of flight capital wants to buy securities, denominated in local currency, without reporting to the government. Then he has to convert dollars at the black rate because conversions in the other exchange markets are registered official 1 y.
Hence there is no reason to expect DES to foster repatriation of flight capital. The advantage of DES as compared to substitute arrangements may be to facilitate political decisions in favor of foreign investments, but apart from this it is hard to identify substantial favorable effects on the international debt situation.
